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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only
a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it.
By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector
of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective:
while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted,
state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign
competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to
impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is
strong.
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Who Gets Caught for Corruption When Corruption is Pervasive?
Evidence from China’s Anti-Bribery Blacklist
1 Introduction
In many countries where bribery is pervasive, government-led anti-corruption com-
missions often fail to reduce corruption (Heilbrunn, 2000). While the causes of such
failure have been discussed extensively, a remaining puzzle is why in these countries
some bribers become the ‘unlucky’ few that get punished whilst others manage to get
away with their illegal payments.
This paper endeavors to find clues to this puzzle by looking for factors that are most
likely to make bribers the target of punishment. We do so by analyzing the features of
firms who were blacklisted for bribery in the healthcare sector in a Chinese province, in
comparison to those not in the list. Under the assumption of pervasive corruption, our
evidence shows that, other things equal, bigger firms (in terms of sales or employment)
are slightly more likely to fall victim to the anti-bribery blacklisting than smaller firms,
and state-owned firms are in an invariably safer position than private firms. This finding
points to the existence of selectivity in blacklisting, and reveals patterns aligned with the
interest of local governments who seek to impose their preferences by exploiting anti-
bribery regulations.
Our research complements the recent micro-level studies on corruption (e.g. Svens-
son, 2003; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Rand and Tarp, 2012; Sequeira and Djankov,
2014). While this literature mainly looks at the firm-level determinants or effects of
bribery, we investigate a distinctively different question, i.e. given the facts of bribery
why do some firms get caught but others do not? In other words, we examine the be-
havior of governments in anti-bribery activities instead of firms in bribery activities, and
to the best of our knowledge, present the first empirical evidence in this regard. Our
research also adds to the political economy literature on regional competition in China.
Theories and evidence show that local protectionism exists within China due to the de-
centralized fiscal system which induces local governments to protect local stakeholders
(Qian and Roland, 1998; Cai and Treisman, 2004; Jin et al., 2005; Bai et al., 2014; Eber-
hardt et al., forthcoming), and due to the political promotion within the Communist Party
which is linked to local economic performance (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005;
Jia et al., 2015). Findings from this research accord with this rationalization but offer a
fresh new angle: anti-bribery blacklisting as a regulatory tool can be used to protect local
governments’ politico-economic interests in certain firms.
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2 Background and Data
Corruption is notoriously endemic in China’s healthcare sector. It is observed that
illicit payment is ‘common knowledge’ in this sector (Daily Mail, 2014), ‘taking bribery
from drug companies. . . is a common hidden rule among doctors’ (ABC News, 2014),
and ‘giving kickbacks to doctors is standard practice for phama companies’ (Financial
Times, 2013). An editorial of the medical journal Lancet comments that ‘bribing doc-
tors to boost drug prescriptions by some drug companies is an open secret [in China]’
(Lancet, 2013). Even the Chinese state media acknowledge the universality and severity
of corruption in this sector. For example, China Daily admits that ‘corruption in China’s
healthcare industry is nothing new’, and ‘pharmaceutical companies regularly offer kick-
backs or free overseas trips to doctors and hospital executives’ (China Daily, 2013). The
state news agency Xinhua Net recognizes that ‘China has a well-established chain of im-
propriety that stretches from the pharmaceutical manufacturers directly to hospitals and
even government authorities’, and gives an estimate that ‘rebates from drugs associated
with commercial bribery cost the country 772 million yuan (US$121 million) every year,
accounting for 16% of the annual tax revenue of the domestic pharmaceutical industry’
(Xinhua Net, 2006). Most observers attribute the above-described universal corruption
to the dysfunctional health system in China especially in terms of low salaries of doctors
and weak implementation of prescription guidelines.1
Based on the above evidence, we maintain the assumption of the prevalence of bribery
in China’s healthcare sector for this research. The widespread corruption gives the gov-
ernment pressure to come up with solutions. In response to the reality, the anti-bribery
blacklist was first introduced as an experimental anti-corruption measure in 2002 in a
district of Ningbo, a major city in Zhejiang Province along the eastern coastline, for
construction industry. The blacklist was then extended to five provinces (Jiangsu, Zhe-
jiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Guangxi) in 2004 for construction industry and further
extended to the whole country in 2006 for five sectors (construction, finance, health, ed-
ucation, and government procurement). In 2009, all sectors and all provinces adopted
the blacklist system. Individual cases in the blacklist can be accessed by the public upon
1Some of the media investigations of the causes of bribery in the healthcare sector are summarized as
follows. China Daily (2011) reports that ‘the average salary of doctors is only 1.19 times greater than what
is made on average by people in the rest of society’. Financial Times (2013) reveals that ‘[m]ost doctors
only make 5,000 to 6,000 yuan (US$812 or US$974) a month in salary, but they are making hundreds
of thousands of dollars a year in kickbacks’. Daily Mail (2014) points out that ‘[l]ow salaries and skimpy
budgets drive doctors, nurses and administrators to make ends meet by accepting money from patients, drug
suppliers and others’. Yang and Fan (2012), a doctor from a public hospital and the chief editor of Chinese
Edition of Lancet respectively, write in a column that ‘many physicians and surgeons consider kickbacks
and bribes from drug companies as compensation for their high training costs and high professional risks’
and that the severe lack of ‘the implementation of existing [prescription] guidelines’ makes it easier for
doctors to improperly ‘prescribe for financial gain’.
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request on an ad hoc basis since 2012.
The anti-bribery blacklist used in this research was obtained from the Health Bureau
of Zhejiang Province in 2011. Firms and individuals included in the list are originally
from legally, administratively, and politically determined bribery cases in the region.2
The list consists of 144 firms with complete information on the name of bribing firm and
value and frequency of bribe in the healthcare sector in the province. The consequence of
being blacklisted is to face a procurement ban: public hospitals and other institutions in
the healthcare sector are barred from purchasing medicines or medical equipments from
these firms and individuals. However, once a firm or individual has been in the list for
two years without being caught for bribery again, it will be deleted from the list. Since
the year of blacklisting is not available, we assume that none of the blacklisted firms were
repeat offenders so that they all entered the blacklist only after 2009.
The blacklisted firms are combined with two micro data sets for more firm-level infor-
mation for the period 2001-2008: (1) China Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms (CASIF)
which covers state-owned firms of all sizes and other firms with annual sales above 5
million yuan (around US$700,000 in 2009 value) in manufacturing industries, and (2)
QIN, a database provided by Bureau van Dijk, which contains similar firm information
for wholesalers in medicine and medical equipments. Matching firms in CASIF-QIN to
the blacklist allows us to identify both blacklisted and non-blacklisted firms. Since we
do not know which firms have sales in Zhejiang, we restrict the sample to firms that are
registered in Zhejiang, who presumably all have sales in this market. We keep 12 three-
digit industries that contain at least one blacklisted firm and these industries are mainly
related to the production and sales of medicines or medical equipments. We only keep
firms which existed through 2008 as this is the year in which all blacklisted firms existed.
We end up with a sample of 3,839 firms for the period 2001-2008, of which 24 were
blacklisted bribers after 2009.
3 Results
The key question of this research is what kinds of features would increase the risk
of a firm being blacklisted. Before formally investigating this question, some statistical
description of the data may provide some clues. To better visualize the result, we present
the comparisons between blacklisted and non-blacklisted firms in Figure 1. The data
points are recovered from regressions where industry specific effects are controlled for to
2The sources include People’s Procuratorates, public health departments of governments, and Commis-
sions for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party.
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ensure comparability of firms. It looks obvious that the blacklisted firms are significantly
and consistently bigger than non-blacklisted firms in terms of sales and employment.
Their premiums in tax contribution and profit are less marked but still visible in most of
the years before they were blacklisted.
[Figure 1 about here]
A major concern about these observed premiums is that the relationship between firm
size and blacklist status could be driven by some other confounding factors that would
lead to a firm being caught. A most compelling suspicion is that bigger firms are finan-
cially more capable of paying bigger bribes (Svensson, 2003) and thus are more likely to
be caught. Unfortunately, since we do not have data on the bribes paid by non-blacklisted
firms, we cannot test the suspicion across all firms. However, since the blacklist database
has information on the values of bribes paid by blacklisted firms, we can examine this
suspicion on blacklisted firms. Figure 2 gives the distribution of value of bribe paid by
blacklisted firms. It shows that the distribution is heavily skewed towards the left end
with the mean (median) being 23 (10) thousand yuan, and, interestingly, the minimum
value of bribe recorded is only 600 yuan (about 90 US$). Given the evidence-based
assumption that every firm has made underground payments, this skewed distribution
suggests that the blacklisting is selective and not monotonically based on the value of
bribe: some firms get caught despite their extremely small bribes, while many others stay
safe although they probably paid more.
[Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 3 we look directly at the relationship between the value of bribe and firm
size. With all blacklisted firms included, there exists a negative correlation significant
at the 5% level. However, this relationship is driven by an obvious outlier in the figure
which is a very small firm who paid nearly 160 thousand yuan, more than twice as much
as the second highest value. However, once this extreme value is excluded, the value of
bribe seems to bear no definite relation with firm size, at least for the blacklisted firms.
Combined with the above evidence, omitting bribe payments due to lack of data is not
likely to be a source of bias.
[Figure 3 about here]
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To more precisely depict the distinguishing features of blacklisted firms, we estimate
linear probability models based on a cross section of firms as follows:3
Blacklisti,2009 = α +Xi,2001,...,2008β + i, (1)
where the dependent variable Blacklisti,2009 is the indicator of whether firm i was black-
listed after 2009,Xi,2001,...,2008 is a vector of firm characteristics averaged across all years
of 2001-2008, and the i is the error term, assumed to be idiosyncratic white noise.
The baseline results are reported in Table 1, where four alternative variables are
adopted as proxies for firm size or financial status: sales, employment, tax contribu-
tion, and profit. They are included separately to avoid multicollinearity. We include firm
ownership dummies (state- and foreign-controlled) with private firms being the reference
group. Firm age is added to capture any possible effect of firm’s market experience on
the propensity of getting blacklisted (or rather, avoiding getting blacklisted). Industry
fixed effects are controlled for throughout all specifications to net out any unobserved
industry-specific time-invariant effects on the chance of getting caught. The estimated
effects of sales and employment turn out to be significantly positive but economically
small, whereas the effect of tax contribution or profit is indistinguishable from zero. Our
interpretation is that the local government tends to blacklist some of the big firms but not
financially well-performing ones. A robust pattern that emerges from all specifications is
that state-controlled firms are 6%-8% less likely to be blacklisted than private players in
the market, thus in a significantly safer position. Firm age only has a marginal impact.
[Table 1 about here]
Given that bribery is commonplace, the above findings imply that firms are not tar-
geted on a level ground. Bigger firms seem to be in a slightly riskier position because the
local government deliberately picks some visible players to perhaps demonstrate its in-
tention of cracking down on corruption. Meanwhile, state-controlled enterprises appear
to be more protected than private firms because of their political and economic impor-
tance to the government. Together, the findings probably suggest a trade-off faced by
an autocratic government, i.e. between “pretending” to be intolerant on corruption and
maintaining a stake in the economy through its business agents.
We then further investigate whether the effects of firm size and performance differ
across firms of different ownership types. The differential effects are estimated from the
interaction terms between the size or performance variables and ownership dummies. The
3We also tried using probit and logit models and the results remained similar.
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results are reported in Table 2. It is clearly shown that as found earlier state ownership
has an invariably protecting role for firms. The effect of firm size or performance on the
propensity of getting blacklisted is virtually identical to previously estimated, and the
effect does not differ across ownership types. To be precise, for all ownership types firm
size increases the risk of being blacklisted while tax contribution or profit has no effect.
[Table 2 about here]
More intriguingly, state ownership seems to protect firms from getting blacklisted, a
finding consistent with Fisman and Wang (forthcoming) and Eberhardt et al. (forthcom-
ing) who show that under various circumstances political connections to the state power
in China offer a shelter against regulations. A take-away implication is that in a business
environment characterized by a weak rule of law and a strong rule of government, exces-
sive regulations may come at a welfare cost: regulations can be used as a protectionist
tool to shield inefficient players from competition and thus beget more distortions.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present the first evidence on why in a corruption-pervasive coun-
try only some firms get caught for bribery while others get away with it. Combining
a sample of manufacturing firms and a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a
province in China, we show that, instead of being based on bribery facts, the government-
led blacklisting is selective: while economically visible (bigger) players are more likely
to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are more protected than private and foreign coun-
terparts. This finding can be rationalized by the argument that the government can use
regulations in a delicate and subtle way to impose its preferences when the rule of law
is weak and the rule of government is strong, and thus creates additional distortions in a
partially reformed economy.
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Table 1. Firm characteristics and propensity of getting blacklisted
LHS: 1(blacklisted after 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales 0.006***
(0.001)
Employment 0.006***
(0.001)
Tax 0.001
(0.001)
Profit 0.000
(0.000)
State -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.082*** -0.064***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
Foreign -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Age 5×E-04*** 4×E-04** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,706 3,705 2,782 3,707
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.112 0.117 0.108
Note. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2. Interactions of firm characteristics and ownership types
LHS: 1(blacklisted after 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
X=Sales X=Employment X=Tax X=Profit
X 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
State*X 0.004 -0.013 0.011 -0.001
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.003)
Foreign*X -0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
State -0.064** -0.070*** -0.066* -0.074**
(0.026) (0.021) (0.035) (0.030)
Foreign -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 5×E-04*** 4×E-04** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,706 3,705 2,782 3,707
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.113 0.118 0.108
Note. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Differences between blacklisted and non-blacklisted firms
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Figure 2. Distribution of value of bribe
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Figure 3. Value of bribe and firm size
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